Why mobile banking is a prime target
For many people, their bank’s app is now their main branch: it is where they check balances, make transfers, pay and approve transactions. That makes it the place where value concentrates and, therefore, a frequent target for fraud.
Attacks on mobile banking rarely break into the bank’s servers. The usual approach is to go after the weakest link: the customer’s phone and the person themselves. That is why a banking app’s security does not end at the backend; what happens on the device it runs on matters too.
What authorities have documented
Three official advisories from different regions show patterns that keep repeating.
Singapore, November 2024. On November 6, 2024, the Singapore Police Force warned about scams involving Android apps installed from outside the official store. Victims were given instructions to turn off the phone’s protections and install the app; once inside, the app gave remote access to the device and made it possible to steal banking credentials.
Spain, July 2022. On July 18, 2022, INCIBE, Spain’s national cybersecurity institute, warned of a fraudulent SMS campaign that led people to install a fake bank “security app”. In reality it was a trojan that logged what the victim typed and intercepted their text messages, including one-time codes.
United States, September 2023. On September 29, 2023, the FBI, through its Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), warned about a scam in which criminals posed as tech support, the bank or a government agency and talked victims into installing remote access software. That advisory focuses on computers, but the pattern, persuading someone to hand over control of their device, is the same one seen on mobile.
All three cases have something in common: the attacker does not need to break the bank’s app. It is enough for the victim to install something, grant permissions or share what is on their screen.
What on-device protection can contribute
Runtime protection does not stop a person from being deceived. What it can do is detect the conditions those deceptions leave on the phone and give your app the chance to react:
- Remote access and device control. On Android, many of these attacks need broad permissions, such as an accessibility service. Detecting accessibility services that are not on your allowlist, and windows overlaid on your app, lets you alert before a sensitive operation.
- A shared or recorded screen. Screen recording or mirroring signals let you hide sensitive data or warn the person that someone might be watching their session.
- Risky apps installed. Detecting apps known for their risk on the phone gives your fraud team context.
- Fake copies of your app. Checking the signature, installation origin and attestation tells your original app apart from a modified copy or a clone.
- Tampered environments. Root, jailbreak, instrumentation and emulators are the foundation of the more technical attacks against the app itself.
The value lies in the timing. Your backend learns about a fraudulent transfer when the request arrives; the device can notice that the screen is being shared, or that an unknown accessibility service is active, before the person taps “confirm”. That is the moment when a warning, an extra check or a pause has the best chance of stopping the fraud.
None of these signals replaces your backend controls, such as behavioral analysis or confirming transactions through another channel. They complement them with information that only exists on the device.
Related regulation, region by region
We reviewed the most relevant security rules for mobile banking in the European Union, the United States and Latin America. None of them names runtime protection, so the relationship we describe is always the same: it helps cover specific technical controls. Compliance depends on your whole program and is determined by your organization.
European Union
- Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389, Article 9. It requires authentication elements to remain independent even when used on multi-purpose devices, such as a phone. It calls for mechanisms that check that the software and device used to authenticate have not been altered. Detecting tampered environments and attestation help cover those mechanisms.
- DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 9. It has applied since January 17, 2025, and deals with protection against and prevention of information and communication technology risks at financial entities. Protecting customer apps is one more piece within that framework.
United States
- FFIEC authentication and access guidance, 2021. It promotes layered security and risk assessment, including the response to customer devices that may be compromised. OCC Bulletin 2021-36 accompanies it and is not listed as rescinded. Device signals help cover that assessment.
- GLBA Safeguards Rule (16 CFR 314.4(c)(4)). For non-bank financial institutions, it calls for secure development practices in their own apps.
Latin America
- Colombia: the SFC’s Basic Legal Circular, reissued through External Circular 006 of 2025, Part I, Title IV, Chapter V. It helps cover security and monitoring controls in apps and mobile channels.
- Mexico: CNBV provisions for credit institutions, Article 316 Bis 15. It helps cover logging the access device identification for each event.
- Brazil: CMN Resolution 4,893/2021, Article 3, as amended by CMN Resolution 5,274/2025. It helps cover intrusion detection and malware protection controls in mobile channels.
- Peru: SBS Resolution 504-2021, Article 17. It helps cover controls against interception and tampering in digital channels.
Global
- PCI DSS v4.0.1, requirement 6.2.4. If your app handles card data, it helps cover protection against tampering with client-side functionality. Version 4.0.1 is still the current version; the council that maintains it opened a public consultation in 2026 to prepare the next one.
You can find these same references, with their links, on the Banking and fintech page.
No rule requires “RASP” by name
It is worth saying clearly, because claims to the contrary circulate: none of the rules we reviewed requires a runtime protection tool by name. What they ask for are outcomes: unaltered devices and software, intrusion detection, malware protection, event logging, risk assessment.
On-device protection is one way to provide evidence for several of those outcomes in the mobile channel. It is not the only one, and it does not, by itself, satisfy any rule.
Checklist for your team
- Map your obligations. Identify which rules apply to your institution and to each market where you operate.
- Turn each obligation into controls. For example: “check that the device has not been altered before authenticating”.
- Assign each control to a layer. Backend, app, device, process. Many controls need more than one.
- Define proportionate responses. What gets recorded, what triggers an alert and what gets blocked, operation by operation.
- Keep the evidence. Incident records with their context, for audits and for your fraud team.
- Educate your customers. Authority advisories show that deception is the first step. No technology replaces that.
Pulse scope
Pulse provides device and application risk signals, configurable policies and centralized reports. The product’s overlay and accessibility signals described here apply to Android; coverage must be assessed per platform.
Attestation can complement backend verification through additional integration. These capabilities do not establish regulatory compliance, guarantee a complete incident record or replace the institution’s security program. Review the banking and fintech scope.
Sources
- Singapore Police Force, advisory of November 6, 2024: police.gov.sg
- INCIBE, advisory of July 18, 2022: incibe.es
- FBI IC3, advisory of September 29, 2023: ic3.gov/PSA/2023/PSA230929
- Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389: eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2018/389/oj
- DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554: eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj
- FFIEC 2021 (Federal Reserve): federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/SR2114.htm
- OCC Bulletin 2021-36: occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2021/bulletin-2021-36.html
- GLBA, 16 CFR part 314: ecfr.gov/current/title-16/part-314
- SFC, Basic Legal Circular (EC 006 of 2025): superfinanciera.gov.co
- CNBV, provisions for credit institutions: cnbv.gob.mx
- Central Bank of Brazil, CMN Resolution 4,893: bcb.gov.br
- SBS, Resolution 504-2021: busquedas.elperuano.pe/dispositivo/NL/1929393-1
- PCI SSC, public consultation on PCI DSS v4.0.1: blog.pcisecuritystandards.org