What it is
This family groups three ways of attacking what your user sees and touches:
- Screen recording or mirroring. Another app, or the system itself, captures what your app shows and sometimes streams it to a third party. In many scams, the fraudster talks the victim into sharing their screen “to help them”.
- Overlays. A window is drawn on top of yours. It can cover a button so the user taps something other than what they think, or show a fake sign-in screen over the real one.
- Accessibility services. They are designed for people with disabilities, such as screen readers. To work, they need broad permissions: reading what appears on screen and acting on the user’s behalf. That is why some malicious apps abuse them.
Why it matters
These attacks do not need to break the phone or modify your app. They work on an intact phone, with your original app, and they target the person more than the code.
The consequences can be serious:
- visible data exposed: balances, verification codes, health information;
- users authorizing operations they did not intend because someone covered their screen;
- remote-access fraud, in which a third party sees and controls the victim’s session.
What makes them hard to stop is that, from the system’s point of view, nothing is broken: recording, overlays and accessibility are all legitimate features being put to the wrong use.
In banking and healthcare, where the screen shows especially sensitive information, knowing that someone else might be watching changes how your app should behave at that moment.
What Pulse does
Pulse detects signs of screen recording or mirroring on Android and iOS, with coverage differences between platforms. On Android it also provides signals about overlays and accessibility services disallowed by policy.
A signal does not identify user intent. Teams must assess context and preserve access for people who rely on assistive technologies.
How it responds
The policy can record the signal, notify the application or trigger termination, where the response is applicable. Actions such as requesting additional verification, restricting an operation or protecting content require implementation in your application.
Local detection and response can work offline. Pending reports are sent when connectivity returns; the console shows the data it receives. History should not be interpreted as a guaranteed record of all device activity.
Before applying restrictions in production, assess detections on the devices and versions used by your organization. Observation mode supports investigating signals and potential false positives without enabling their restrictive response. Define separate policies for development, testing and production.
Scope and limitations
- Static screenshots. Pulse does not by itself prevent screenshots. Protecting content requires additional application measures.
- Android coverage. Not all recording or projection methods are detected.
- Platform differences. The overlay and accessibility service signals described here apply to Android.
- Social engineering. Detection does not replace fraud prevention, customer support or backend validation.
Do not configure application termination because an accessibility service is in use. Evaluate signals through recording or notification and avoid excluding people who need those services.